The effects of regulating interchange fees at cost on the ATM market by Donze, Jocelyn & Dubec, Isabelle
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The effects of regulating interchange fees
at cost on the ATM market
Jocelyn Donze and Isabelle Dubec
Universite´ des Sciences Sociales de Toulouse, TSE (GREMAQ)
3. October 2008
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11252/
MPRA Paper No. 11252, posted 26. October 2008 10:59 UTC
The effects of regulating interchange fees at cost on
the ATM market
Jocelyn Donze∗and Isabelle Dubec†
October 3, 2008
Abstract
We show that regulating the interchange fee at cost reduces banks’ incen-
tives to deploy free ATMs over time. Simultaneously, more and more pay-to-use
ATMs are deployed by independent ATM deployers. These results are consis-
tent with the recent evolution of the British ATM market.
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Recently, the use of interchange fees in payment systems have been questioned
by competition authorities. In some countries, public authorities have required in-
terchange fees to be set to reflect costs. An interesting example can be found in the
British ATM market. In 2000, the Cruickshank Review, an independent investigation
on competition in the banking industry, expressed concerns over several points. First,
entry was not free on the ATM market: only card issuers could deploy ATMs. Sec-
ond, the wholesale pricing of transactions was more reflecting the bargaining power of
banks than pure cost considerations: large issuers were receiving higher interchange
fees on shared transactions than small issuers.1 Third, the retail pricing involved large
markups over costs: larger issuers were charging ”foreign fees” to their cardholders
on shared transactions as high as 5 or 6 times the level of the interchange fee.
Following the publication of the review, LINK the operator of the British shared
ATM network, made two decisions: it opened up membership to non-card issuers,
therefore permitting independent ATM deployers (hereafter IADs) to enter the mar-
ket. It also made the multilateral interchange fee cost-based and reviewed annually.2
By the end of 2000, banks also dropped the existing foreign fees.
The new LINK policy had several consequences on ATM deployment: by mid
2000, interchange fees decreased from 28 pence to 20 pence for a branch machine and
from 40 pence to 30 pence for a non-branch machine. From the same year, IADs
entered the market and began to deploy pay-to-use machines. Table 1 shows a rapid
growth of surcharging ATMs between 2000 and 2006. During the same time the
deployment of free ATMs slowed. Most of the new fee-charging machines have been
installed in locations where there did not exist any ATM previously. But some banks
have also sold some of their non-branch machines to independent deployers: in 2004,
the bank HBOS sold 816 non-branch machines to the IAD Cardpoint. The Treasury
Committee of the House of Commons (2005) notes “If others follow suit, there could
be conversion of a large number of free ATMs to charging and significantly lower
access to free cash withdrawals for many consumers.”
1In ATM markets, the interchange fee is paid by the card issuer to the ATM owner on shared
transactions.
2The interchange fee is calculated by dividing the total annual cost of deploying and running the
network by the total number of withdrawals processed (House of Commons, Treasury Committee
(2005)).
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#ATMs 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Free 28 29 32 32 33 33 35
Pay to use 4 7 10 15 22 25 26
Total 33 36 42 48 55 58 61
Table 1 : ATM deployment in the UK (source: LINK).
In this paper, we examine the effects of regulating the interchange fee at cost on
the ATM deployment. The predictions of the model fit the empirical evidence: we
show that this regulation makes the interchange decrease over time, which in turn
reduces banks’ incentives to deploy ATMs. IADs, if present, deploy more and more
charging ATMs.
1 The model with banks
1.1 The model and the equilibrium
b banks provide access to a network of compatible ATMs. As in the UK, banks do
not levy fees for ATM usage. In this case ATMs are identical for customers and
ATM deployment does not influence banks’ deposit market shares: the number of
cardholders of bank i is fixed to Di.
3 The total mass of consumers is normalized
to one. Each cardholder makes w withdrawals. The number of ATMs deployed by
bank i is ni and the total number of ATMs is n. We assume that each bank deploys
its ATMs uniformly in the shopping space and that each cardholder allocates his
withdrawals according to the ATM market shares: he makes wni/n withdrawals at
bank i’s ATMs. The cost of deploying and operating an ATM is denoted by c.4 When
a cardholder of bank i makes a withdrawal at an ATM of bank j, bank i pays an
interchange fee, a, to bank j.
The profit of bank i is
pii = a(1−Di)ni
n
w − aDin− ni
n
w − cni
3Donze and Dubec (2006), (2008) study models with endogenous deposit market sizes.
4This cost is annual and includes depreciation, installation, site rental, maintenance, communi-
cation costs, cash replenishment, and the opportunity cost of the cash in the machine.
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We look for the Nash equilibrium of the game. Bank i maximizes its profit with
respect to ni. The first order condition is
a(1−Di)(1− ni
n
)
w
n
+ aDi(1− ni
n
)
w
n
− c = 0
The term w/n is the number of withdrawals per ATM. There are two effects when
bank i deploys an extra ATM. There are new withdrawals from non-customers that
were using other banks’ machines. Interchange inflows increases by a(1 − Di)(1 −
ni/n)(w/n). There are also new withdrawals from own-customers that were us-
ing other banks’ machines. Bank i interchange outflows diminishes by aDi(1 −
ni/n)(w/n). Summing the b FOC over i, we obtain the total network size:
n∗(a) =
b− 1
b
× aw
c
and n∗i (a) = n
∗(a)/b for i = 1, ...b.
Clearly a higher interchange fee makes banks deploy more ATMs as competition
to process withdrawals is strengthened. Note that - and this is a key point - at
equilibrium, the sum of the interchange inflows over banks is equal to the total cost
of the network for any interchange fee:∑
i
a(1−Di)n
∗
i (a)
n∗(a)
w = a(1− 1
b
)w = cn∗(a)
One should not be surprised by this result. It comes from the fact that at equilibrium,
the average interchange inflows per ATM, a(1− 1/b)(w/n∗) is equal to the marginal
revenue of any bank i, a(1−Di)(1− 1/b)(w/n∗) + aDi(1− 1/b)(w/n∗) which is also
equal to the marginal cost, c.
1.2 Effects of the British regulation scheme
Let us denote by t = 1, 2, ..., the dates at which the interchange fee is reviewed. The
interchange fee at date t is at. The interchange fee at date t+ 1 is
at+1 ≡ cn
∗(at)
w
=
b− 1
b
at
Proposition 1 Regulating the interchange fee at cost makes the interchange fee de-
crease over time, which lowers banks incentives to deploy ATMs.
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We have noted that for any interchange fee, the sum over banks of interchange
inflows is equal to the total cost of the network. However interchange inflows are
only generated by foreign withdrawals. By dividing the network cost by the total
number of withdrawals, the regulator induces a new interchange fee that is below the
previous break-even level. Consequently banks reduce the size of their ATM networks
which makes the number of withdrawals per machine rise. In turn, this induces a
lower average cost per withdrawal, which drives the interchange fee downward at the
subsequent regulatory review, and so on.
Probably that the predictions of the model are too extreme in the sense that
there should exist a lower bound on the number of ATMs deployed by each bank
corresponding to its number of branches. Indeed, branch machines are not only
deployed to generate interchange revenues but also to replace more costly human
tellers.
2 Introduction of Independent ATM deployers
There are now b banks and d independent ATM deployers (IAD). IADs do not have
cardholders and just deploy ATMs. The deployment is uniform in the shopping space.
The number of ATMs deployed by IAD i is n˜i. We let n˜ =
∑i=d
i=1 n˜i. The total network
size is n+ n˜. As before, withdrawing cash at an ATM operated by a bank is free. We
assume that the number of withdrawals made at ATMs of bank i is (ni/(n + n˜))w.
Withdrawing cash at an ATM operated by IAD is not free: there is a fee si per
withdrawal. We take s1 = ... = sd = s ≥ a where s is an exogenously fixed variable.5
We assume that the number of withdrawals made at ATMs of IAD i is λ(n˜i/(n+ n˜))w
where λ is an exogenous parameter satisfying 0 < λ ≤ 1. As withdrawing cash is
more costly using an IAD’s ATM, we assume that if banks and IADs have the same
number of machines, there will be 1/λ times more withdrawals at banks’ ATMs than
at IADs’ ATMs.
The cost of deploying and running an ATM is c for a bank. We take into account
cost differences between banks and IADs when deploying ATMs:6 the cost of deploy-
5In the UK, the IADs can either choose to receive the interchange fee a or to receive a fee s for
each withdrawal processed.
6According to Link, the typical cost of operating a free cash machine is £19,000 per year at a
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ing and running an ATM is µc for an IAD with µ satisfying 0 < µ ≤ 1. The profit of
bank i is
pii = a(1−Di) ni
n+ n˜
w − aDin+ n˜− ni
n+ n˜
w − cni
The profit of the independent deployer i is
pii = λs
n˜i
n+ n˜
w − µcn˜i
We let
α(a) =
µ
λ
a
s
An α(a) larger than 1 means that banks have a comparative advantage over IADs
when deploying ATMs. We describe the Nash equilibrium of the game.
• If α(a) ≥ 1/(1− 1
b
) network sizes are
n∗(a) + n˜∗(a) =
b− 1
b
× aw
c
;n∗(a) > 0; n˜∗(a) = 0
• If α(a) ∈ [1− 1
d
, 1/(1− 1
b
)
]
we have
n∗(a) + n˜∗(a) =
b+ d− 1
b+ α(a)d
× aw
c
n∗(a)
n∗(a) + n˜∗(a)
=
b+ (α(a)− 1)bd
b+ α(a)d
n˜∗(a)
n∗(a) + n˜∗(a)
=
α(a)d− (α(a)− 1)bd
b+ α(a)d
Over this set, one can verify that (n∗ + n˜∗)(a) and n∗(a) are increasing in a while
n˜∗(a) is decreasing.
• If α(a) ≤ 1− 1
d
, network sizes are
n∗(a) + n˜∗(a) =
d− 1
d
× λsw
µc
;n∗(a) = 0; n˜∗(a) > 0
To study the effect of the British regulation scheme, let us assume that initially
α(a0) ≥ 1/(1− 1/b): only banks deploy ATMs. At first the interchange fee decreases
according to the rule
at+1 =
b− 1
b
× at
branch, and £33,000 at other locations for a bank The cost is £9500 for an IAD (House of Commons,
Treasury Committee. 2005).
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Banks gradually reduce the size of their ATM fleets. Once α(at) becomes smaller
than 1/(1− 1/b), the interchange fee keeps decreasing according to the rule
at+1 =
cn∗(a)
wn∗(a)/(n∗(a) + n˜∗(a))
=
c(n∗(a) + n˜∗(a))
w
=
b+ d− 1
b+ α(at)d
× at
which is strictly smaller than at. Simultaneously, IADs deploy more and more ATMs
while banks withdraw their machines. Once α(at) becomes smaller than 1− 1/d, the
interchange fee is arbitraly fixed at the level (d − 1)/d × (λs/µ) and a stationary
state is reached. Only IADs deploy ATMs. We sum up the results in the following
proposition:
Proposition 2 When independent ATM deployers are present on the market, regu-
lating the interchange fee at cost reduces the level the interchange fee gradually. As
a consequence, the number of free machines deployed by banks decreases while the
number of pay-to-use machines deployed by IADs increases.
As the interchange fee decreases, the comparative advantage of IADs over banks
α(a) increases, which makes IADs deploy more and more machines.
3 Conclusion
In 2005, the British Treasury Committee noted that “the mechanism by which the
interchange fee is calculated may give banks an incentive to pursue efficiency savings
by reducing the availability of free cash machines in low footfall areas”. We have
constructed a model that shows that setting ATM interchange fees at cost leads to
decreasing incentives to deploy free ATMs. The model could explain part of the evo-
lution of the ATM market in the United Kingdom since 2000. Interestingly from the
end of 2006, the LINK network has set a premium of up fifty per cent per interchange
fee when withdrawals are made at sites with low volume or located in poor areas. This
confirms the presumption that the regulating scheme was probably too stringent to
maintain free non-branch machines.
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